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 2001 
REDEFINING EN BANC REVIEW IN THE 
FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS 
Alexandra Sadinsky* 
 
Every circuit has the ability to review cases en banc.  Hearing cases en 
banc allows the full circuit court to overturn a decision reached by a three-
judge panel.  Due to the decreasing probability of U.S. Supreme Court 
intervention, the circuit court is often the court of last resort in the ordinary 
life of a case, thereby amplifying the importance of en banc review.  Despite 
its significance, many critics contend that en banc review is inefficient and 
rarely granted. 
Each circuit has enacted its own rules governing en banc procedure.  
These rules have both slight and significant differences from one another 
and from Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35, which governs all of the 
circuits’ en banc review procedures.  Because of the lack of uniformity 
across the circuits, the proper application of Rule 35 is unclear. 
This Note proposes to change the current en banc landscape by altering 
the method in which a court will make the decision to sit en banc.  This 
Note suggests that petitions for en banc review should only be raised by 
judges sua sponte, and the decision of whether to sit en banc should be 
affirmatively voted on by a lower number of active-duty judges than is now 
required under the simple majority rule. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1988, a jury convicted Gregory Wilson of murder, kidnapping, rape, 
robbery, and conspiracy to commit robbery.1  Wilson’s trial has been 
regarded as “one of the worst examples . . . of the unfairness and abysmal 
lawyering that pervade capital trials,” with commentators noting that his 
“defense was clearly a charade” and that he was “sentenced to death in a 
kangaroo court.”2 
Wilson’s case began with a handwritten note from the trial judge begging 
for a lawyer to represent Wilson.3  The handwritten note, posted on the 
courtroom door, read:  “PLEASE HELP.  DESPERATE.  THIS CASE 
CANNOT BE CONTINUED AGAIN.”4  While the judge found two 
lawyers to represent Wilson, it was soon clear that neither was competent.5  
One lawyer had never tried a felony case.6  The other was a “‘semi-retired’ 
 
 1. See Wilson v. Rees, 620 F.3d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 2. See Wilson v. Rees, 624 F.3d 737, 739, 741 (6th Cir. 2010) (Martin, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); see also Andrew Wolfson, Kentucky Death-Row Inmate’s 
Trial Littered with Problems, COURIER-J., Sept. 8, 2010, at A1. 
 3. See Wilson, 624 F.3d at 739. 
 4. See id. 
 5. See Wolfson, supra note 2. 
 6. See id. 
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lawyer who volunteered to serve as lead counsel for free” and had no office, 
staff, copy machine, or law books.7  The case was referred to as “a ‘travesty 
of justice’ and among the worst examples . . . of a defendant tried for his 
life with unqualified counsel.”8  Additionally, extreme bias undermined the 
fairness of Wilson’s trial:  Wilson’s co-defendant, who testified against 
Wilson, was having sexual relations with the trial judge’s colleague 
throughout the duration of Wilson’s trial.9  The jury sentenced Gregory 
Wilson to death.10 
Wilson appealed his judgment and sentence.  The U.S. Supreme Court 
denied certiorari on October 4, 1993, concluding direct review of his case.11  
On November 21, 2007, Wilson filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in the 
Eastern District of Kentucky for injunctive relief.12  The § 1983 action 
challenged the constitutionality of Kentucky’s lethal injection protocol 
under the U.S. Constitution and the Kentucky Constitution.13  On 
September 30, 2009, the district court dismissed with prejudice Wilson’s 
complaint as time barred by Kentucky’s one-year statute of limitations on 
civil actions, which stipulates that the accrual date for method of execution 
claims is the date of the conclusion of direct review.14  On September 3, 
2010, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, agreeing that 
Wilson’s complaint was time barred.15 
On September 3, 2010, Wilson petitioned the Sixth Circuit for rehearing 
en banc (i.e., rehearing by the full appellate court).16  A poll was taken, and, 
because less than a majority of the active judges favored doing so, en banc 
review was denied.17  Sixth Circuit Judge Boyce F. Martin, Jr., however, 
filed a vigorous dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.18 
Wilson’s case highlights the significance of en banc review.19  Gregory 
Wilson was sentenced to death by the state trial court, denied certiorari by 
the Supreme Court, and denied injunctive relief by the Sixth Circuit in part 
because he was unable to get the Sixth Circuit to rehear his case en banc.  
Although some of the active Sixth Circuit judges voted to rehear the case en 
banc to reassess the Sixth Circuit’s rule that time barred his complaint, a 
majority was not attained and, thus, Wilson’s case was not heard on the 
 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. 
 9. See Wilson, 624 F.3d at 738 (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 10. See Wilson v. Rees, 620 F.3d 699, 700 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 11. See Wilson v. Kentucky, 507 U.S. 1034, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 909 (1993). 
 12. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, Wilson v. Rees, 3:07-
CV-00078 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 21, 2007), ECF No. 1. 
 13. See Wilson, 620 F.3d at 700. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 701. 
 16. See Wilson v. Rees, 624 F.3d 737, 738 (6th Cir. 2010). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id. at 738–41 (Martin, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 19. The term “in banc” appeared in earlier versions of Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 35. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (1967) (amended 2005). The rule currently uses the 
term “en banc,” see id. R. 35 (2005), and the current spelling will be used throughout this 
Note other than in quoted excerpts from other written works. 
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merits.  It is unclear which circuit judges voted to rehear Wilson’s case en 
banc, as the circuits are not required to publish these votes.20  It is also 
unclear why en banc review was denied, as the circuits similarly are not 
required to provide their reasoning for denying review.21 
En banc review gives every judge on a circuit court the opportunity to 
review a decision announced by a three-judge panel.  Because of the 
discretionary nature of the writ of certiorari, very few cases are granted 
review by the Supreme Court.  Practically speaking, the courts of appeals 
are the courts of last resort for the vast majority of cases.22  Despite the 
significance of en banc review, the federal courts of appeals very rarely sit 
en banc.23  En banc hearings consistently make up less than 1 percent of the 
caseload of the federal circuit courts.24  In 2010, for example, en banc 
decisions accounted for only 0.146 percent of the cases decided by the 
federal circuit courts.25  In the Second Circuit, which grants the lowest 
percentage of en banc petitions, en banc cases were only 0.03 percent of its 
total docket in 2010.26 
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure permits a case to be 
heard or reheard en banc if so ordered by “[a] majority of the circuit judges 
who are in regular active service.”27  Rule 35 warns, however, that an en 
banc hearing or rehearing “is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered 
unless:  (1) en banc consideration is necessary to secure or maintain 
uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a 
question of exceptional importance.”28 
Although Rule 35 seems straightforward, its application is anything but 
clear.  The determination of whether to grant review en banc has sparked 
controversies between judges on the same court.29  Although en banc 
review has a huge impact on a circuit court’s jurisprudence, as it is the 
mechanism available for overruling precedent within a circuit,30 many 
 
 20. See Abigail Stecker, En Banc Revealed:  Procedure, Politics, and Privacy 17 (Dec. 
2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://works.bepress.com/abigail_stecker/2/. 
 21. See Michael E. Solimine, Due Process and En Banc Decisionmaking, 48 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 325, 326–30 (2006). 
 22. See infra notes 60–64 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REV. 29, 29–30 
(1988). 
 25. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., EN BANC PRACTICES IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT:  
TIME FOR A CHANGE? 5 (2011), available at http://www.federalbarcouncil.org/vg/custom/
uploads/pdfs/En_Banc_Report.pdf. 
 26. See id. at 4–5. 
 27. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a). 
 28. See id. 
 29. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying rehearing en 
banc).  In Ricci, five separate opinions were published responding to the denial of rehearing 
en banc. See id. at 88 (Calabresi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 89 
(Katzmann, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 90 (Parker, J., concurring 
in the denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 92 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of 
rehearing en banc); id. at 93 (Cabranes, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 30. See Amy E. Sloan, The Dog That Didn’t Bark:  Stealth Procedures and the Erosion 
of Stare Decisis in the Federal Courts of Appeals, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 713, 718–19 (2009).  
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judges and scholars argue that the en banc procedure is a waste of judicial 
resources; although almost all en banc petitions are denied, counsel 
generally files them as a matter of course.31 
There is little transparency in a circuit court’s decision to grant en banc 
review, and little is known about why courts select certain cases for en banc 
review while denying others.  Generally, a case will be heard en banc only 
if each of three conditions are met:  (1) a litigant files a petition, or a judge 
asks, for a hearing or rehearing en banc;32 (2) a judge in active service on 
the circuit requests that the entire court be polled on the petition;33 and (3) a 
majority of the judges in active service vote to grant the petition.34  Despite 
the confusion surrounding the en banc procedure, one thing is perfectly 
clear:  en banc hearings and rehearings are rarely granted.35 
Like most procedures in the federal courts, en banc procedures have their 
positive and negative aspects.36  Unlike most others, however, en banc 
procedure is often the subject of institutional derision by many circuit 
judges and is a subject of exceptional controversy.37 
This Note assesses the controversy over en banc procedure and the 
various points of inconsistency among the circuit courts on whether, and 
under what circumstances, to grant en banc review.  Part I provides the 
context for this discussion.  Specifically, it discusses the history of the 
federal court system and the initial debate over the en banc procedure.  It 
explores Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,38 where the 
Supreme Court first approved the en banc procedure.  It also discusses 
Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.,39 where 
the Court enunciated “certain fundamental [en banc] requirements [that] 
should be observed by the Courts of Appeals.”40  Part I then explores 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 in greater detail and related federal 
procedural rules which impact the decision to hear or rehear a case en banc. 
 
While the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court are not bound by their own 
opinions, they do not routinely disregard them. Id. at 717.  “Horizontal stare decisis” refers 
to the rule that courts conform to their own prior decisions. Id. at 717–18.  Horizontal stare 
decisis is not a requirement but, rather, a preferred policy that allows people to “know the 
rules that govern their conduct to organize their lives, and basic fairness requires that 
similarly situated parties be treated similarly.” Id. at 718.  The circuit courts follow “the law-
of-the-circuit rule” which implements the policy of horizontal stare decisis. Id.  “The law of 
the circuit rule provides that the decision of one panel is the decision of the court and binds 
all future panels unless and until the panel’s opinion is reversed or overruled, either by the 
circuit sitting en banc or the Supreme Court.” Id. at 718–19. 
 31. See Irving R. Kaufman, Do the Costs of the En Banc Proceeding Outweigh Its 
Advantages?, 69 JUDICATURE 7, 57 (1985). 
 32. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(b); see also id. R. 35 advisory committee’s note. 
 33. See id. R. 35(f). 
 34. See id. R. 35(a). 
 35. See infra Part II.A. 
 36. See infra Part III.A–B. 
 37. See infra Part III.B. 
 38. 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
 39. 345 U.S. 247 (1953). 
 40. Id. at 260. 
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Part II provides a survey of the various en banc procedures the thirteen 
circuit courts use.  It analyzes the points where the circuits differ on the 
question of when to grant en banc review.  Specifically, Part II examines 
the frequency of en banc hearings and rehearings, language disparities in 
local circuit rules governing en banc procedure, idiosyncrasies in certain 
circuit courts’ en banc procedures, and informal polling procedures utilized 
by some of the circuits to replace en banc review. 
Part III addresses the positive and negative aspects of en banc review, as 
enunciated by various judges and scholars.  Finally, considering all of these 
benefits and criticisms, Part IV argues that petitions for en banc review 
should only be raised by judges sua sponte.  Further, Part IV contends that 
granting petitions for en banc review should require a fewer number of 
votes than the simple majority vote required under Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 35. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
To understand the en banc procedure one must first understand how the 
federal courts of appeals developed a practice of sitting in three-judge 
panels, rather than as an entire court.  This Part discusses the evolution of 
the federal court system, the creation of our now familiar federal courts of 
appeals, and the development of the panel system to hear and decide cases.  
Part I.A provides a history of the federal court system, the initial debate 
over whether a circuit could convene en banc, and the ultimate acceptance 
and development of the en banc procedure by the Supreme Court and 
Congress.  Part I.B examines Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the current appellate rule governing en banc hearings and 
rehearings.  It also examines related federal procedural rules that impact a 
circuit’s ability to convene en banc. 
A.  The History of En Banc Review 
Part I.A.1 discusses the creation of our now-familiar federal courts of 
appeals and the evolution of our three-tiered federal court system.  Part 
I.A.2 discusses the initial circuit split over whether a circuit court could 
hear cases as a full court and the approval of the en banc procedure by the 
Supreme Court in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,41 the 
ratification of this decision by Congress in 28 U.S.C. § 46(c),42 and the 
development of the en banc procedure by the Supreme Court in Western 
Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad Co.43 
 
 41. 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
 42. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006). 
 43. 345 U.S. 247. 
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1.  The Evolution of the Courts of Appeals 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 created the federal court system.44  The Act 
created a Supreme Court, district courts, and the old “Circuit Courts.”45  
Section 11 of the Act gave the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the 
state courts over civil cases where the amount in controversy exceeded 
$500 and where the United States was plaintiff or petitioner; where an alien 
was a party; or where the suit was between a citizen of the state where the 
suit was brought and a citizen of another state.46  It gave the circuit courts 
exclusive jurisdiction of crimes and offenses under the authority of the 
United States, except as otherwise provided elsewhere in the Act or by 
federal law.47  It gave the circuit courts concurrent jurisdiction with the 
district courts for criminal offenses made cognizable by that court.48 
Additionally, the Act gave the circuit courts authority to review on writ 
of error final decisions of the district courts in civil cases where the amount 
in controversy exceeded $50 and, on appeal, final decrees in admiralty and 
maritime cases where the matter in controversy exceeded $300.49  Where 
the amount in controversy exceeded $2,000, however, the Supreme Court 
had appellate jurisdiction to review the decision of the circuit court.50 
The Act also provided that the circuit courts would sit twice a year in the 
various districts comprising their circuit.51  The Act provided that the 
circuit courts would sit in three-judge panels, but it did not create circuit 
judgeships.52  Rather, a circuit would be composed of two Supreme Court 
justices and one district court judge from the district in which the case was 
pending.53  No district judge, however, was allowed to sit on appeal from 
his own decision.54 
When Congress passed the Judiciary Act of 1869, it finally provided for 
the permanent appointment of circuit judges and appointed one circuit 
judge for each of the then-existing nine circuit courts.55  The circuit judge 
was to sit on a three-judge panel with two other federal judges drawn from 
the Supreme Court or from the district courts comprising the circuit.56 
On March 3, 1891, Congress passed the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of 
189157 (the Evarts Act).  The Evarts Act established the now-familiar three-
 
 44. See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (2d ed. 2002). 
 45. See ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION OF COURTS 103–04 (1940).  There were 
originally three circuits:  the eastern, middle, and southern circuits. Id. 
 46. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78. 
 47. Id., 1 Stat. at 78–79. 
 48. Id., 1 Stat. at 79. 
 49. Id. §§ 11, 21, 22, 1 Stat. at 78–79, 83–85. 
 50. Id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84. 
 51. Id. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74–75. 
 52. See Tracey E. George, The Dynamics and Determinants of the Decision To Grant En 
Banc Review, 74 WASH. L. REV. 213, 221 (1999). 
 53. See POUND, supra note 45, at 104. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 2, 16 Stat. 44, 44. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826. 
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tiered judicial system and a circuit court of appeals in each circuit.58  The 
Evarts Act also created the discretionary writ of certiorari.59 
The Evarts Act did not abolish the old circuit courts, but it took away 
their appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in their circuits and gave 
it to the new circuit courts of appeals.60  The determination of appeals by 
the new circuit courts was to be final unless the Supreme Court decided to 
grant review by certiorari.61  Review by certiorari, however, “is not a matter 
of right, but of judicial discretion,” and will be “granted only for 
compelling reasons.”62  The following are some of the reasons that the 
Supreme Court has found “compelling”: 
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict 
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same 
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far 
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or 
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of 
this Court’s supervisory power; 
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in 
a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last resort 
or of a United States court of appeals; 
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an 
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled 
by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way that 
conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.63 
Thus, because the writ of certiorari is rarely granted,64 circuit courts have 
the final word in most cases. 
 
 58. See POUND, supra note 45, at 198. 
 59. See Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari:  Some Reflections Seventy-Five 
Years After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1650–51 (2000).  The Supreme 
Court maintained mandatory appellate jurisdiction over many of the cases decided by the 
courts of appeals, but was given discretionary appellate jurisdiction over cases otherwise 
deemed “final” in these courts. See id. 
 60. See POUND, supra note 45, at 198 (“[R]eview of judgments, decrees, and sentences 
in the District and Circuit Courts was committed to the Circuit Courts of Appeals.”). 
 61. See id. 
 62. SUP. CT. R. 10.  In the first two years after the Evarts Act, only two petitions for 
certiorari were granted. See Hartnett, supra note 59, at 1656.  Congress expanded the 
Supreme Court’s discretionary power over their appellate docket in the Judges’ Bill of 1925. 
See Emily Grant et al., The Ideological Divide:  Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari 
Decision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 565 (2012).  The Judges’ Bill of 1925 eliminated many 
categories of cases for which Supreme Court review was mandatory and instead made these 
cases reviewable by a writ of certiorari. Id.  The Supreme Court, by way of the Judges’ Bill, 
“effectively ‘achieved absolute and arbitrary discretion over the bulk of its docket.’” Id. 
(quoting Hartnett, supra note 59, at 1705). 
 63. SUP. CT. R. 10. 
 64. The contemporary Supreme Court hears far fewer cases than its predecessors. See 
Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking Docket, 53 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1224 (2012).  Since the 2005 term, the Supreme Court has 
decided an average of eighty cases per term. See id. at 1225.  Earlier in the twentieth century 
2014] REDEFINING FEDERAL EN BANC REVIEW 2009 
Section 2 of the Evarts Act carried forward the practice of sitting in 
three-judge panels by providing that each circuit court “shall consist of 
three judges.”65  The Evarts Act also created an additional circuit judge for 
each circuit, thus “providing two circuit judges in all the circuits except the 
second, which, having received an additional judge in 1887, now had 
three.”66  The third spot on the three-judge panel would be filled by either a 
district judge or a Supreme Court justice.67 
In the Judicial Code of 1911, Congress finally abolished the old circuit 
courts created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 and vested all original 
jurisdiction in the district courts.68  Additionally, it codified section 2 of the 
Evarts Act without material change—it kept the circuit courts of appeals 
established by the Evarts Act and carried forward the three-judge panel 
requirement.69  The Code, however, increased the number of circuit judges 
from three to four in the Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits, although it 
made no express provision authorizing these judges to sit in panels of more 
than three judges.70  Because Congress allowed these circuits to have more 
than three judges, there was uncertainty as to whether Congress intended 
these circuits to continue hearing cases only by three-judge panels or 
whether a full court hearing was also permissible.71 
In the following years, as court dockets and caseloads grew, Congress 
continued to increase the number of circuit judgeships across all the 
circuits, but the circuits continued the practice of sitting in divisions of three 
judges rather than sitting as an entire court.72  The increased number of 
circuit judges, however, presented the likelihood of inconsistent panel 
decisions within the circuit and created the need for an administrative 
solution.73 
2.  The En Banc Procedure 
The en banc procedure was first approved by the Supreme Court in 1941 
in Textile Mills,74 after the Third and Ninth Circuits generated conflicting 
decisions over whether the court had the power to convene itself en banc. 
 
the average was approximately 200 cases per term. Id.  For a comprehensive survey of the 
decline in the Supreme Court’s docket size, see id. 
 65. See Circuit Court of Appeals (Evarts) Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826. 
 66. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND 
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 29 (6th ed. 2009); POUND, supra note 45, at 197.  In the following 
years, additional judges were added to each circuit at various times. POUND, supra note 45, at 
197. 
 67. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 66, at 29–30. 
 68. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 
133 (1928). 
 69. See George, supra note 52, at 224. 
 70. A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals:  
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part 1), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 570 (1965). 
 71. See id. at 570–71. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. at 570–72. 
 74. 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
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The Ninth Circuit, on June 27, 1938, was the first circuit court to address 
the permissibility of circuit courts sitting en banc.  In Bank of America 
National Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Commissioner,75 a divided Ninth Circuit 
panel decided a question regarding estate taxes.  In Lang’s Estate v. 
Commissioner,76 decided one year later, a different Ninth Circuit panel 
addressed the same question but disagreed with the decision of the Bank of 
America panel.77  The panel in Lang’s Estate concluded, however, that the 
Judicial Code of 1911 did not allow “more than three judges [to] sit in the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, [and] there [was] no method of hearing or 
rehearing by a larger number.”78  Thus, rather than overrule the Bank of 
America decision, the Lang’s Estate panel presented a certificate to the 
Supreme Court to answer the estate tax question.79 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and agreed with the second panel 
on the estate tax question, but did not address the question of whether a 
circuit court had the power to convene itself en banc.80 
By contrast, two years later, in Commissioner v. Textile Mills Securities 
Corp.,81 the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, noted that although contrary to 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding, a circuit court has the power to sit en banc.82  
The Third Circuit justified its use of the en banc procedure by explaining:  
“A court, as distinguished from the quorum of its members whom it may 
authorize to act in its name, cannot consist of less than the whole number of 
its members.”83  It contended that holding otherwise would “destroy the 
authority of the court as a court and [would] open the way to possible 
confusion and conflict among its personnel and in its procedure and 
decisions.”84  The potential for this confusion occurs most significantly, the 
court said, where “there is a difference in view among the judges upon a 
question of fundamental importance” and where a panel “sitting in a case 
may have a view contrary to that of the other . . . judges of the court.”85  In 
these situations, the court reasoned, “it is advisable that the whole court 
have the opportunity, if it thinks it necessary, to hear and decide the 
question.”86 
In light of “the public importance” of the en banc question and to resolve 
the conflict between the Third and Ninth Circuits, the Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Textile Mills87 and unanimously decided that the 
 
 75. 90 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1937). 
 76. 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938). 
 77. See id. at 869. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. at 869–70. 
 80. See generally Lang v. Comm’r, 304 U.S. 264 (1938). 
 81. 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), aff’d, 314 U.S. 326 (1941). 
 82. See id. at 67–71. 
 83. See id. at 70. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 71. 
 86. See id. 
 87. 314 U.S. 326, 327 (1941). 
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federal courts of appeals have the power to convene themselves en banc.88  
In its decision, the Court noted that allowing a court to sit en banc “makes 
for more effective judicial administration,” avoids intracircuit conflicts, and 
promotes “[f]inality of decision in the circuit courts of appeal.”89  After 
approving the en banc device in Textile Mills, the Supreme Court stopped 
accepting cases certified to it by a court of appeals in order to resolve a 
point of intracircuit conflict.90 
On June 25, 1948, Congress codified the Textile Mills decision in section 
46(c) of the Judicial Code of 1948.91  Section 46(c) provides: 
Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel 
of not more than three judges . . . unless a hearing or rehearing before the 
court in banc is ordered by a majority of the circuit judges of the circuit 
who are in regular active service.  A court in banc shall consist of all 
circuit judges in regular active service. . . .92 
The Reviser’s Note explains: 
This section preserves the interpretation established by the Textile Mills 
case but provides in subsection (c) that cases shall be heard by a court of 
not more than three judges unless the court has provided for hearing in 
banc. This provision continues the tradition of a three-judge appellate 
court and makes the decision of a division, the decision of the court, 
unless rehearing in banc is ordered. It makes judges available for other 
assignments, and permits a rotation of judges in such manner as to give to 
each a maximum of time for the preparation of opinions.93 
Textile Mills and the Judicial Code of 1948 clearly give the federal courts 
of appeals the power to convene en banc.  However, neither Textile Mills 
nor the Judicial Code of 1948 prescribe any particular en banc procedures 
for the circuit courts to follow, nor do they state the types of cases that are 
appropriate for en banc review.  The Supreme Court did not offer any more 
clarity on the power to convene en banc until it decided Western Pacific 
twelve years later.94 
In Western Pacific, the Supreme Court held that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) 
empowers, but does not compel, federal circuit courts to sit en banc.95  The 
Court determined that § 46(c) does not give litigants the power to compel a 
circuit court to entertain each motion for a hearing or rehearing en banc, and 
a party cannot challenge the circuit court’s decision to grant or deny a 
 
 88. See id. at 333–35. 
 89. See id. at 334–35. 
 90. See, e.g., Wisniewski v. United States, 353 U.S. 901, 902 (1957) (refusing to grant 
certiorari to resolve potential conflict between two Eighth Circuit panels). 
 91. See United States v. Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 689 (1960) (noting that 
section 46(c) “was added to the Judicial Code in 1948 simply as a legislative ratification of 
Textile Mills” (internal quotation mark omitted)). 
 92. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006). 
 93. Id. note (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
 94. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247 (1953). 
 95. See id. at 250 (“In our view, § 46(c) is not addressed to litigants.  It is addressed to 
the Court of Appeals.  It is a grant of power.  It vests in the court the power to order hearings 
en banc.  It goes no further.”). 
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request for an en banc hearing.96  Rather, § 46(c) allows a circuit court “to 
devise its own administrative machinery to provide the means whereby a 
majority may order [an en banc] hearing.”97  The Court, after holding that a 
litigant cannot compel a circuit court to formally examine an en banc 
petition and that § 46(c) does not require any particular en banc procedures, 
devised “certain fundamental [en banc] requirements [that] should be 
observed by the Courts of Appeals.”98 
The Court enunciated five requirements:  First, the circuit court must 
clearly define the procedure it uses to determine whether to convene en 
banc.99  Second, the circuit may adopt a practice where a majority of the 
full court determines whether to convene en banc or it may delegate this 
decision to a division of the full court; however, a majority of the full court 
always has the power to revise the circuit’s en banc procedures and 
withdraw any decisionmaking power delegated to a division of the court.100  
Third, the circuit must give a litigant the opportunity “to suggest to the 
court, or to the division . . . that a particular case is appropriate for 
consideration by all the judges.”101  Fourth, a circuit has the power to 
initiate an en banc hearing sua sponte.102  Fifth, the decision of whether to 
hear a case en banc must be decided separately from the decision of 
whether there should be a rehearing before a three-judge panel.103 
Following the Supreme Court’s Western Pacific decision, each circuit 
enacted its own rules and developed its own case law governing the en banc 
procedure.104  The broadly defined en banc requirements enunciated in 
Western Pacific gave the federal circuit courts ample discretion to create 
their own en banc procedures.  The en banc procedural rules developed by 
each circuit were not uniform and often did not fully explain the processes 
used by the courts when considering whether to grant en banc review.105 
B.  Rule 35 and Related Rules 
When considering available options, a practitioner who has suffered an 
adverse determination by a three-judge panel will turn to Rule 35 of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.106 
Rule 35 governs en banc hearings and rehearings in the federal courts of 
appeals.107  Congress ratified Rule 35 in 1967, intending to standardize the 
en banc procedures across the circuits.108 
 
 96. See id. at 252, 259. 
 97. See id. at 250. 
 98. See id. at 260. 
 99. See id. at 260–61. 
 100. Id. at 261. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See id. at 262. 
 103. See id. at 262–63. 
 104. See infra notes 121–26 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra Part II. 
 106. See FED. R. APP. P. 35. 
 107. See id. 
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Rule 35 tracked the language of 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) by stating that “[a] 
majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order 
that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of 
appeals in banc.”109  Rule 35 sets time limits and certain procedures for a 
party petitioning for a hearing or rehearing en banc, provides that the court 
is not required to file a response to a suggestion for a hearing or rehearing 
en banc, and provides that an en banc hearing or rehearing “is not favored 
and ordinarily will not be ordered unless:  (1) en banc consideration is 
necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions; or (2) 
the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.”110 
The “maintain[ing] uniformity” test allows the circuit courts to use the en 
banc process to resolve intracircuit conflict.111  The “exceptional 
importance” test anticipates future conflict between the majority of the 
judges of a circuit and a three-judge panel’s decision and permits the full 
court to rehear the case before that anticipated conflict arises.112  The 1967 
Advisory Committee’s Note makes clear that Rule 35 does not affect the 
power of the court to initiate en banc hearings or rehearings sua sponte—in 
other words, the court can initiate the en banc procedure without the request 
of a litigant.113 
Generally, a case will be heard en banc only if three conditions are met:  
(1) a litigant files a petition or a judge asks for a hearing or rehearing en 
banc,114 (2) a judge in active service on the circuit requests that the entire 
court be polled on the suggestion,115 and (3) a majority of the judges in 
active service vote to grant the petition.116 
 
 108. See Mario Lucero, Note, The Second Circuit’s En Banc Crisis, 2013 CARDOZO L. 
REV. DE NOVO 32, 38 (2013). 
 109. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 (1967) (amended 2005).  This language was amended in 2005 
and now states:  “A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service and who 
are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the 
court of appeals en banc.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (emphasis added).  This language was added 
as a result of a circuit split regarding how disqualified judges were to be dealt with in 
determining how many judges made up a majority of the court. Id. advisory committee’s 
note.  The 2005 amendment adopted the “case majority” approach where disqualified judges 
are not counted in the base number of judges when determining whether a majority of judges 
have voted to hear a case en banc. Id.  Additionally, senior circuit judges are not eligible to 
participate in the decision of a case on rehearing en banc. See United States v. Am.-Foreign 
S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685, 688 (1960).  This is because en banc courts should not be 
employed unless “extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative consideration 
and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the law of the 
circuit.” See id. at 689. 
 110. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)–(c), (e).  In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship 
Corp., the Supreme Court declared that “[e]n banc courts are the exception, not the rule” and 
should be “convened only when extraordinary circumstances exist that call for authoritative 
consideration and decision by those charged with the administration and development of the 
law of the circuit.” See Am.-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. at 689. 
 111. See Solimine, supra note 21, at 325–38. 
 112. See Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102 HARV. L. REV. 864, 876 (1989). 
 113. See FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee’s note. 
 114. See id. R. 35(b). 
 115. See id. R. 35(f). 
 116. See id. R. 35(a). 
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In the Omnibus Judgeship Act, which was passed on October 20, 1978, 
Congress authorized federal circuit courts consisting of more than fifteen 
judges to delegate en banc authority to a division of the full court, 
commonly referred to as a “mini en banc hearing” or “limited en banc 
court.”117  Currently, the Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits have more than 
fifteen authorized judgeships.118  But only the Ninth Circuit has exercised 
this option formally.119  Many circuits, however, have devised methods of 
informal en banc review.120 
Each court of appeals has authority to make and amend rules governing 
its own practice and procedure.121  These rules are referred to as the “local 
rules” of the circuit.122  Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Appellate 
Procedure says that “local rules” are to be enacted by a majority of the 
circuit’s judges “in regular active service.”123  It also provides that a local 
rule must be consistent with federal law, the appellate rules, and local rules 
of the circuit.124  Every circuit has a local rule governing the en banc 
procedure.125  Additionally, the First, Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eleventh Circuits have “internal operating procedures” governing 
petitions for en banc hearings or rehearings.126 
II.  SURVEY OF THE CIRCUITS:  INCONSISTENCY 
This Part surveys the various points of inconsistency in en banc 
procedures across the federal courts of appeals.  Part II.A analyzes the 
frequency at which particular circuits implement the en banc procedure.  
Part II.B scrutinizes the local rules and internal operating procedures of the 
 
 117. See Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 1629, 1633 (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006)). 
 118. See 28 U.S.C. § 44.  The Fifth Circuit has seventeen authorized judgeships, the Sixth 
Circuit has sixteen authorized judgeships, and the Ninth Circuit has twenty-eight authorized 
judgeships. See id. 
 119. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3 (“The en banc court, for each case or group of related cases 
taken en banc, shall consist of the Chief Judge of this circuit and 10 additional judges to be 
drawn by lot from the active judges of the Court.”). 
 120. See infra Part II.D. 
 121. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071. 
 122. See FED. R. APP. P. 47. 
 123. See id. R. 47(a)(1). 
 124. See id. R. 47(b). 
 125. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-1 to -11; 1ST CIR. R. 35; 6TH CIR. R. 35; D.C. CIR. R. 35; 2D CIR. 
R. 35.1; 8TH CIR. R. 35A; 5TH CIR. R. 35; 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 to -4; FED. CIR. R. 35; 3D CIR. R. 
35.0–.4; 4TH CIR. R. 35; 7TH CIR R. 35; 10TH CIR. R. 35.1–.7. 
 126. See 11TH CIR. I.O.P. (accompanying FED. R. APP. P. 35); 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35; 3D CIR. 
I.O.P. 2.2, 9.1–.6; 2D CIR. I.O.P. 35.1; 5TH CIR. I.O.P. (Petition for Rehearing En Banc); 7TH 
CIR. APP. III I.O.P. 5; 1ST CIR. I.O.P. X.  Internal operating procedures guide the inner conduct 
of the court. See 20A JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 347.12 (3d ed. 
2013).  However, unlike local rules, a circuit court promulgating or amending an internal 
operating procedure does not have to give appropriate public notice and opportunity for 
comment. See id. §§ 347.11–.12.  Appellate Rule 47(a)(1) mentions internal operating 
procedures but does not describe them. See FED. R. APP. P. 47(a)(1).  Rule 47, however, 
prohibits a circuit court from putting “[a] generally applicable direction to parties or lawyers 
regarding practice before a court” in an internal operating procedure, rather, it must be in a 
local rule. See id. 
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various circuits to identify where language differences exist between:  
(1) the local rules of the circuits themselves and (2) the local rules of the 
circuits and Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.  Part II.C 
looks at idiosyncrasies of particular circuits’ en banc procedures.  Finally, 
Part II.D identifies informal polling procedures utilized by some circuit 
courts to undo a circuit’s precedent without further briefing or argument by 
the litigants. 
A.  Frequency of Use 
En banc hearings and rehearings represent a small fraction of all cases 
heard by the federal courts of appeals.  For example, in 2010, the circuit 
courts heard forty-five cases en banc out of more than 30,914 cases 
terminated on their merits.127  While en banc review is relatively rare in all 
circuits, the circuits vary in how frequently they use the en banc 
procedure.128  For instance, the Federal Circuit seems particularly attuned to 
using en banc review,129 while the Second Circuit is the least likely to use 
it.130 
1.  The Second Circuit’s “Tradition” 
One reason the Second Circuit may tend to refrain from invoking the en 
banc procedure is because of “tradition.”131  Second Circuit Judge Robert 
A. Katzmann explains that the Second Circuit has a “longstanding tradition 
of general deference to panel adjudication—a tradition which holds whether 
or not the judges of the Court agree with the panel’s disposition of the 
matter before it.  Throughout [its] history, [the Second Circuit] ha[s] 
proceeded to a full hearing en banc only in rare and exceptional 
circumstances.”132 
 
 127. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., supra note 25, at 5. 
 128. For example, looking at the data from 2001 to 2009, the frequency of en banc cases 
in each circuit from lowest to highest, based on the percentage of en banc cases of a circuits’ 
total docket, was:  0.01 percent in the Second Circuit; 0.07 percent in each of the Third, 
Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits; 0.08 percent in the Fifth Circuit; 0.09 percent in the Fourth 
Circuit; 0.10 percent in the First Circuit; 0.13 percent in the Sixth Circuit; 0.14 percent in the 
Ninth Circuit; 0.15 percent in the D.C. Circuit; 0.19 percent in the Tenth Circuit; 0.23 
percent in the Eighth Circuit; and 0.30 percent in the Federal Circuit. See Ryan Vacca, 
Acting Like an Administrative Agency:  The Federal Circuit En Banc, 76 MO. L. REV. 733, 
738 (2011). 
 129. Other circuits that hear a larger proportion of cases en banc include the D.C., Eighth, 
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. See SECOND CIRCUIT COURTS COMM., supra note 25, at 6. 
 130. See id.  From 2000 through 2010, the average number of en banc cases heard in the 
Second Circuit was about one-eighth that of the system-wide average. See id. at 4. 
 131. See Wilfred Feinberg, Unique Customs and Practices of the Second Circuit, 14 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 297, 311 (1986) (“The tradition of hostility to in bancs goes back a long 
way in the Second Circuit.  Learned Hand strongly disapproved of in bancs, and while he 
was Chief Judge [the Second Circuit] had none.”). See generally Ricci v. DeStefano, 530 
F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying rehearing en banc). 
 132. See Ricci, 530 F.3d at 89–90 (Katzmann, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
banc); see also id. at 89 (Calabresi, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc) 
(“[R]ehearing en banc is always a matter of choice, not necessity . . . .”). 
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Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs, also of the Second Circuit, criticizes using 
“tradition” as a reason not to grant en banc hearings and rehearings.133  He 
argues that by using tradition to avoid convening en banc, the Second 
Circuit fails to exercise the discretion called for by Rule 35.134  He further 
argues that the exercise of discretion to hear cases en banc is integral to the 
judicial process particularly because “en banc proceeding[s] provide[] a 
safeguard against unnecessary intercircuit conflicts.”135  Finally, he argues, 
relying on tradition to deny en banc rehearings “look[s] very much like 
abuse of discretion.”136 
2.  Shaping Patent Policy in the Federal Circuit 
Out of all thirteen circuits, the Federal Circuit hears the largest 
proportion of its total cases en banc.137  Professor Ryan Vacca has offered 
two possible explanations for this.138 
The first is geographic proximity—because all the active judges on the 
Federal Circuit sit in only one location—Washington, D.C.—it is 
particularly easy for them to convene as a full court.139  However, while 
this may explain some of the differences between the Federal Circuit and 
other circuits, it does not explain the difference between the Federal Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit, where all of the active judges also sit in only one 
location.140 
The second possible explanation is that the Federal Circuit uses its en 
banc procedure to engage in substantive rulemaking.141  The Federal Circuit 
serves as the appellate body for cases “arising under[] any Act of Congress 
relating to patents,”142 and, accordingly, “[t]he Federal Circuit’s numerous 
en banc hearings . . . set forth rules regarding a wide range of issues and 
sub-issues . . . which consequently set patent policy.”143  Professor Vacca 
argues that the Federal Circuit’s frequent use of en banc sittings make the 
court look much like an administrative agency engaging in substantive 
rulemaking, and he suggests this practice is beneficial in shaping patent 
policy as a whole.144 
 
 133. See id. at 92–93 (Jacobs, C.J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 134. See id. 
 135. See id. at 93 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee’s notes (1998 
Amendments)). 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Vacca, supra note 128, at 738–39. 
 138. See id. at 738, 744–59. 
 139. See id. at 738–39. 
 140. See Douglas H. Ginsburg & Donald Falk, The Court En Banc:  1981–1990, 59 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1008, 1016 (1991).  The D.C. Circuit hears on average 0.15 percent fewer 
cases en banc than the Federal Circuit. See supra note 128. 
 141. See Vacca, supra note 128, at 744–49. 
 142. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) (2006) (granting the Federal Circuit “exclusive 
jurisdiction” over appeals in cases where a district court’s jurisdiction was based on a 
congressional act relating to patents). 
 143. Vacca, supra note 128, at 747. 
 144. See generally Vacca, supra note 128. 
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3.  Utilizing En Banc Review To Maintain  
Intracircuit Consistency 
There seems to be a correlation between the frequency of en banc 
hearings and rehearings in a particular circuit and the size of the circuit 
court.  Larger circuits may need to use en banc review more frequently in 
order to maintain intracircuit consistency.145  In theory, the consistency of 
decisions of a court sitting in panels would diminish “as the pool of judges 
from which a panel may be drawn expands.”146  The First Circuit’s en banc 
practice suggests that this theory has some merit.  For example, from 1983 
to 2007, the First Circuit, the circuit with the smallest number of judgeships 
(at only nine judges, of which five are active-duty judges),147 handed down 
only forty-four en banc rulings.148  This suggests that the First Circuit may 
not use en banc review to maintain intracircuit consistency but rather may 
grant en banc review only to hear cases of “exceptional importance.”149  
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit, the circuit with the largest number of 
judgeships (at twenty-seven active-duty judges), hears a larger proportion 
of its total cases en banc.150  Thus, these statistics suggest that a larger court 
will have a greater reason to resort to rehearings en banc more frequently to 
maintain consistency in its panel decisions.151 
4.  The Costs of En Banc Review 
The frequency of en banc hearings and rehearings in a particular circuit 
may be impacted by the costs associated with using the procedure.  A larger 
court must incur a greater cost to hear a case en banc for two reasons.  First, 
in a larger court, more judges have to hear or rehear the case, which 
increases the amount of total judicial time consumed.  Second, the time 
spent preparing an opinion after an en banc sitting is significantly greater 
for larger courts.152  This is because “[t]he author of the opinion for the 
 
 145. See Procter Hug, Jr. & Carl Tobias, A Preferable Approach for the Ninth Circuit, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1657, 1668 (2000). 
 146. Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1018. 
 147. See Judges, U.S. CT. APPEALS FOR FIRST CIRCUIT, http://www.ca1.uscourts.
gov/judges (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (listing the names of both active and senior judges on 
the court). 
 148. See Stephen L. Wasby, A Look at the Smallest Circuit, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 417, 
429–30 (2010).  Most First Circuit en banc courts are composed of five, six, or seven judges. 
Id. at 435.  While an en banc court consists of all active judges, senior judges who were on 
the panel of a case being reheard en banc may sit on the en banc court. See id. at 434. 
 149. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2).  “The small number of judges on the [First Circuit]—
small even if the senior judges are included—may facilitate greater collegiality . . . .” Wasby, 
supra note 148, at 424.  This may also explain the low number of concurring and dissenting 
First Circuit opinions. Id. 
 150. See supra note 128.  This may also be because of the Ninth Circuit’s limited en banc 
court. See infra Part II.C.1. 
 151. In an empirical study of en banc decisions by district courts it was found that 
districts with more judges were more likely to sit en banc. See Ahmed E. Taha, How Panels 
Affect Judges:  Evidence from United States District Courts, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 1235, 1273 
(2005). 
 152. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1018–20. 
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court must circulate it to [all judges] rather than to two colleagues, each of 
whom may make comments or suggestions, or indeed, launch a dissent that 
needs to be addressed.”153  Additionally, revising opinions consumes much 
more time on hearings or rehearings en banc than it does with a three-judge 
panel because 
at each step the opinion writer must accommodate multiple, sometimes 
conflicting, suggestions; and the author must secure anew the concurrence 
of each member of the majority or minority for which he or she writes 
each time the opinion is revised in response to a further iteration by the 
other faction.154 
Thus, it is significantly less costly for a smaller court—like the First 
Circuit—to hold an en banc hearing or rehearing rather than a larger 
court—like the Fifth155 or Ninth Circuit.156 
In sum, the circuits have differing opinions about the utility of en banc 
proceedings.  Those circuits that frequently invoke the en banc procedure 
presumably believe it is useful to do so.  Those circuits that rarely invoke 
the en banc procedure presumably believe the cost of doing so is not 
outweighed by a benefit to the administration of justice. 
B.  Lack of Uniformity in Language 
Because Western Pacific gave the circuit courts ample discretion to 
establish en banc procedures,157 the circuit courts enacted local en banc 
rules and internal operating procedures to govern their en banc procedures.  
These rules, however, are often circuit specific and contain differences from 
other regional circuits and also from the text of Rule 35. 
1.  Exceptional “Public” Importance 
Rule 35(a)(2) states, “An en banc hearing or rehearing is not favored and 
ordinarily will not be ordered unless the proceeding involves a question of 
exceptional importance.”158  The Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits have a 
local rule that states that en banc review is an extraordinary procedure 
intended to focus the full court on an issue of “exceptional public 
importance.”159  This language differs from Rule 35, which does not 
 
 153. Id. at 1019. 
 154. See id. 
 155. The Fifth Circuit, with seventeen authorized judgeships, is the next largest circuit 
after the Ninth Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (2006). 
 156. Although the costs associated with en banc sittings are greater for larger courts, 
some larger courts (like the Ninth Circuit) convene en banc at a greater frequency than 
smaller courts. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  This suggests that the risk of 
intracircuit inconsistency justifies the use of the costly en banc procedure. See supra Part 
II.A.3. 
 157. See W. Pac. R.R. Corp. v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 345 U.S. 247, 250 (1953). 
 158. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 159. See 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35 (emphasis added); 5TH CIR. I.O.P. (Petition for Rehearing En 
Banc) (emphasis added); 10TH CIR. R. 35.1(A) (emphasis added). 
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specify that matters must be of exceptional importance to the “public.”160  It 
also differs from the local rules of the Third, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits, 
which do not specify that matters must be of exceptional importance to the 
public.161  The First, Second, Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuits do 
not have a local rule altering Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
35(a)(2).162  The Ninth Circuit Local Rule does not mention the exceptional 
importance test but, rather, sets up a unique test of its own.163 
Determining what “exceptional importance” means is not an easy task 
and “begs the question of whether courts should weigh the impact on the 
public, the judiciary, or the parties.”164  A case is likely to be of exceptional 
importance to the public “if it concerns either a unique issue of great 
moment to the community, or a recurring issue that is likely to affect a large 
number of cases or persons.”165  In the history of the D.C. Circuit’s en banc 
practice, the cases arising out of the Watergate affair and the cases 
involving the subpoena of the President’s tapes are examples of cases that 
were considered of exceptional importance to the public.166 
Alternatively, a case is likely to be of exceptional importance to the court 
if it involves “questions concerning the jurisdiction of the court or the 
standards for determining the justiciability of a particular case—including 
matters such as standing, and ripeness.”167  This is because “[t]he resolution 
of these questions provides the bar with important guidance as to whether 
and when a party may litigate in [a] circuit.”168 
And finally, a case is likely to be of exceptional importance to the parties 
when, although the issues raised are not particularly significant to the public 
generally or to the court, the “cases involv[e] large amounts of money or 
hav[e] extraordinary emotional impact upon the individuals involved, 
regardless of the likely importance of the case as a precedent.”169 
 
 160. See FED. R. APP. P. 35. 
 161. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-3; FED. CIR. R. 35(b); 3D CIR. R. 35.1. 
 162. See 1ST CIR. R. 35; D.C. CIR. R. 35; 2D CIR. R. 35; 8TH CIR. R. 35A; 4TH CIR. R. 35; 
7TH CIR. R. 35. 
 163. See infra Part II.B.3. 
 164. See Sarah J. Berkus, Note, A Critique and Comparison of En Banc Review in the 
Tenth and D.C. Circuits and United States v. Nacchio, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1069, 1073 
(2009). 
 165. See Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1025. 
 166. See id. at 1025–26. 
 167. See id. at 1028–29.  Despite the Tenth Circuit’s local rule that it will only take cases 
of “exceptional public importance,” it has interpreted this language loosely and often takes 
cases based on their importance to judicial administration. See, e.g., United States v. 
Nacchio, 555 F.3d 1234 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (granting en banc review to determine 
whether evidentiary evidence was properly excluded); Cortez v. McCauley, 478 F.3d 1108 
(10th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (granting en banc review to determine whether a claim of 
excessive force must be subsumed into a claim of unlawful seizure); Robbins v. Chronister, 
435 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (granting en banc review to determine whether to 
place a cap on attorneys’ fees for those representing prisoners). 
 168. See id. at 1029. 
 169. Id. at 1032.  Some commentators have doubted the legitimacy of exceptional 
importance to the parties as a criterion for allocating the attention of the full court. Id. at 
1031–32.  The Federal Circuit’s “practice notes” seem to recognize that this type of 
“exceptional importance” is not legitimate. See U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FED. 
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However, because courts rarely state their reasons for granting en banc 
review and because en banc cases rarely fit neatly into one category or the 
other, it is extremely difficult to classify to whom and to what extent the 
court considers the matter exceptionally important.170 
2.  En Banc Review of Opinions Directly Conflicting 
with State Law Precedent 
While en banc review can be extremely beneficial, it also comes with 
great costs.171  For example, the Fifth Circuit Rules seem to discourage 
filings of suggestions for en banc review.172  Local Rule 35 of the Fifth 
Circuit recognizes that “each request for en banc consideration . . . is a 
serious call on limited judicial resources.”173  The corresponding Fifth 
Circuit internal operating procedure refers to the extraordinary nature of 
petitions for rehearing en banc and characterizes these suggestions as “the 
most abused prerogative.”174  This internal operating procedure also states, 
however, that “[a] petition for rehearing en banc is an extraordinary 
procedure that is intended to bring to the attention of the entire court an 
error of exceptional public importance or an opinion that directly conflicts 
with prior Supreme Court, Fifth Circuit or state law precedent.”175  No 
other circuit has a local rule that states that the en banc procedure is 
appropriate when an opinion directly conflicts with state law precedent.  
Rather, the Sixth Circuit Rules and the Eleventh Circuit Rules explicitly 
state that an alleged error in the determination of state law is not appropriate 
grounds for a rehearing en banc but instead is a matter for panel 
rehearing.176 
In theory, the Fifth Circuit’s internal operating procedure authorizing en 
banc review of decisions that directly conflict with state law precedent 
suggests that the Fifth Circuit has broader discretion in deciding whether to 
grant en banc review.  The Fifth Circuit, the largest circuit after the Ninth 
Circuit, however, hears very few cases en banc.177  From 2001 to 2009, for 
example, the Fifth Circuit heard only 0.08 percent of its total cases en 
banc.178  In comparison, the First Circuit, the smallest circuit, heard 0.10 
percent of its total cases en banc during the same time period.179 
 
CIRCUIT, RULES OF PRACTICE 77 (2011), available at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/images/
stories/rules-of-practice/rules.pdf (“A petition for rehearing en banc is rarely appropriate if 
the appeal was the subject of a nonprecedential opinion by the panel of judges that heard 
it.”). 
 170. See Berkus, supra note 164. 
 171. See infra Part III.B; see also supra Part II.A.4. 
 172. See 5TH CIR. R. 35.1; 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 35. 
 173. See 5TH CIR. R. 35.1. 
 174. See 5TH CIR. I.O.P. 35. 
 175. See id. (emphasis added). 
 176. See 6TH CIR. I.O.P. 35(a); see also 11TH CIR. R. 35-3. 
 177. See supra note 128. 
 178. See id. 
 179. See id. 
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3.  The Ninth Circuit’s “Stringent” Rule 
The Ninth Circuit has a local rule that states that “[w]hen the opinion of a 
panel directly conflicts with an existing opinion by another court of appeals 
and substantially affects a rule of national application in which there is an 
overriding need for national uniformity, the existence of such conflict is an 
appropriate ground for petitioning for rehearing en banc.”180  The Ninth 
Circuit’s local rule seems to reject using en banc review to maintain 
intracircuit consistency181 because it requires a panel opinion to directly 
conflict with an opinion by “another court of appeals”182 and also requires 
that the decision substantially affects a rule of national application.183 
Although the Ninth Circuit Rules seem to limit the types of cases that 
warrant en banc review, the Ninth Circuit grants en banc review at a 
significantly higher rate than most other circuits.184 
4.  Rules Governing Amicus Curiae Briefs in Connection 
with Petitions for En Banc Review 
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs prior to the issuance of a panel 
decision.185  The rule permits governmental parties to file an amicus curiae 
brief as of right (i.e., “without the consent of parties or leave of court”); all 
other potential amici, however, “must obtain either consent of all the parties 
or leave of court to file a brief.”186 
The Eleventh Circuit has adopted additional local rules governing the 
submission of amicus curiae briefs in support of petitions for rehearing or 
rehearing en banc.187  Consistent with Rule 29, governmental parties may 
file an amicus curiae brief in support of a petition for rehearing or rehearing 
en banc as of right.188  However, a nongovernmental entity or an individual 
must obtain leave of court to file an amicus curiae brief in support of a 
petition for rehearing or rehearing en banc.189  The Eleventh Circuit local 
rules require court approval—consent of the parties is not adequate.190  The 
 
 180. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-1. 
 181. Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a)(1), however, specifically states that en 
banc hearings or rehearings can be ordered when “en banc consideration is necessary to 
secure or maintain uniformity of the court’s decisions.” FED. R. APP. P. 35(a)(1). 
 182. 9TH CIR. R. 35-1.  The Supreme Court has indicated that a conflict between circuits 
may be an appropriate reason to grant an en banc rehearing, at least when the judges of a 
circuit express doubt about the correctness of their own circuit’s precedent. See Groves v. 
Ring Screw Works, 498 U.S. 168, 172 n.8 (1990). 
 183. 9TH CIR. R. 35-1. 
 184. See supra note 128. 
 185. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a). 
 186. See P. Stephen Gidiere III, The Facts and Fictions of Amicus Curiae Practice in the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 3 (2008) (quoting FED. R. 
APP. P. 29(a)). 
 187. See 11TH CIR. R. 35-6, 35-9. 
 188. See id. R. 35-6. 
 189. See id. 
 190. See id. 
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local rules also contain requirements on the contents, length, and time for 
filing of all amicus curiae briefs in support of a petition for rehearing or 
rehearing en banc.191 
The Eleventh Circuit’s local rules governing amicus briefs in support of 
petitions for rehearing or rehearings en banc are more restrictive than the 
majority of other circuits.192  Most other circuits do not have specific local 
rules governing amicus curiae briefs at the rehearing or rehearing en banc 
stages, which means that the general requirements of Federal Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 29(a), which allows filing by consent of all the parties, 
apply in those circuits.193  The D.C. Circuit has the most restrictive local 
rule at the en banc stage, allowing amicus curiae briefs only by invitation of 
the court.194 
5.  Frivolous En Banc Petitions and Rule 11 Sanctions 
The Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuits have a local rule which cautions 
litigants not to file frivolous en banc petitions.195  Their local rules make 
clear that frivolous en banc petitions that do not meet the standards of 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 may subject the person who signed 
the petitions, the represented party, or both to Rule 11 sanctions.196 
This is noteworthy because many judges and commentators argue that 
the en banc procedure is inefficient and a waste of judicial resources 
because litigants generally file en banc petitions as a matter of course.197  
The Fifth, Eighth, and Federal Circuit local rules seem to be attempting to 
address this issue.198 
In practice, however, the Federal Circuit hears the most cases en banc 
proportionately compared to the other circuits, the Eighth Circuit hears the 
second most cases en banc, and the Fifth Circuit hears the ninth most cases 
en banc.199  Thus, it is not clear that the sanction rules effectively deter an 
 
 191. See id. 
 192. See Gidiere, supra note 186, at 4. 
 193. See id. at 4–5. 
 194. See D.C. CIR. R. 35(f). 
 195. See 8TH CIR. R. 35A(2); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1; FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2). 
 196. See 8TH CIR. R. 35A(2) (“The court may assess costs against counsel who files a 
frivolous petition for rehearing en banc deemed to have multiplied the proceedings in the 
case and to have increased costs unreasonably and vexatiously.  At the court’s order, counsel 
personally may be required to pay those costs to the opposing party.”); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1 
(“The court takes the view that, given the extraordinary nature of petitions for en banc 
consideration, it is fully justified in imposing sanctions on its own initiative . . . upon the 
person who signed the petitions, the represented party, or both, for manifest abuse of the 
procedure.”); FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2) (“A petition for hearing or rehearing en banc that does 
not meet the standards of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) may be deemed 
frivolous and subject to sanctions.”); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1) (“[T]he court may 
impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law firm, or party that violated [Rule 11, 
which requires a representation of nonfrivolity,] or is responsible for the violation.”). 
 197. See Kaufman, supra note 31, at 57. 
 198. See 8TH CIR. R. 35A(2); 5TH CIR. R. 35.1; FED. CIR. R. 35(a)(2). 
 199. See supra note 128. 
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attorney or litigants’ decision of whether to file a petition for an en banc 
hearing or rehearing.200 
C.  Unique Idiosyncrasies 
Various circuit courts have developed their own unique practices for both 
choosing en banc cases and for conducting en banc review.  While some of 
these practices are listed in the circuits’ local rules, others are not.  A couple 
of examples of unique idiosyncrasies of certain circuits are discussed in 
turn. 
1.  The Limited En Banc Court 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit to formally exercise the limited en 
banc court option made available by Congress in the Omnibus Judgeship 
Act of 1978.201  The “limited en banc” is not truly “en banc” because it is 
not the full court.  There are currently twenty-seven active-duty judges on 
the Ninth Circuit,202 but the limited en banc court consists of only eleven 
Ninth Circuit judges203—fewer than half of all active judges.  The Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc court consists not of all twenty-seven active judges on the 
circuit, but rather of the chief judge of the Ninth Circuit (or, in the absence 
of the chief judge, the next most senior active judge) and ten additional 
judges to be drawn by lot from the active judges of the court.204 
Some critics of the limited en banc procedure disfavor it because it could 
allow a minority view to become the judgment of the full court.205  On the 
Ninth Circuit, it takes a vote of fourteen judges to hear an appeal of a three-
judge decision en banc.206  In theory, the eleven judges on the Ninth 
Circuit’s en banc panel, ten of whom are chosen at random from the full 
court, may come to a different result than the full court would.  This is 
because six judges, a simple majority of the eleven-member en banc panel, 
 
 200. Very few en banc petitions, however, are manifestly frivolous and, therefore, “each 
judge is burdened with considering each suggestion to the extent necessary to determine 
whether it is one of those few cases each year that really should be reheard en banc.” See 
Ginsburg & Falk, supra note 140, at 1051. 
 201. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3; see also Act of Oct. 20, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-486, § 6, 92 Stat. 
1629, 1633 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006)) (providing that any federal 
appellate court with more than fifteen active judges could “perform its en banc function by 
such number of [judges] . . . as may be prescribed by rule of the court of appeals”).  The 
Fifth and Sixth Circuits also have more than fifteen authorized judgeships but have not 
availed themselves of the option Congress permitted in the Omnibus Judgeship Act. See 28 
U.S.C. § 44(a). 
 202. See Circuit Judges:  Biographies, U.S. COURTS FOR NINTH CIRCUIT, http://www.ce9.
uscourts.gov/ninthcircuit/circuit_judges.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014) (listing names of 
active duty judges on the court). 
 203. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. 
 204. See id. 
 205. See Pamela Ann Rymer, The “Limited” En Banc:  Half Full, or Half Empty?, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 317, 321 (2006). 
 206. See FED. R. APP. P. 35(a) (“A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active 
service and who are not disqualified may order that an appeal or other proceeding be heard 
or reheard by the court of appeals en banc.”). 
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could vote to reaffirm the three judge panel decision that fourteen judges 
who voted for en banc rehearing would have reversed, thus establishing 
Ninth Circuit law that a majority of judges on the Ninth Circuit do not 
support.207  The Ninth Circuit’s procedure, however, allows a majority of 
the court’s active judges to force a case decided by a limited en banc court 
to be reheard by the full court.208  There is no indication that this provision 
has ever been invoked. 
2.  The Federal Circuit’s Unique Amicus Brief Practice 
Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure allows for 
nongovernmental amicus curiae to file briefs but requires leave of court or 
consent of the parties.209  Therefore, except in cases where the court grants 
leave in its en banc order, “amici curiae first must file a motion for leave or 
go through the process of obtaining consent of the parties before filing a 
brief.”210 
Many of the Federal Circuit’s en banc orders permit amici curiae to file 
briefs and, in some cases, “the Federal Circuit specifically invites . . . the 
[Patent and Trademark Office] to file an amicus brief.”211  This is not the 
common standard in the other circuits.212  The Federal Circuit’s practice of 
inviting amici to file briefs in en banc cases indicates a “stronger attitude of 
inclusiveness” than that of the other circuits.213 
D.  Informal Polling 
Informal en banc review is a procedure where one “federal circuit court 
panel circulates an opinion to the full court for acquiescence in an action as 
a substitute for formal en banc review.”214  Informal en banc processes 
usually entail circulating an opinion to the full court with an explanation 
that the opinion takes an action that would ordinarily require the court to 
convene en banc.215  The opinion includes an “invitation to call for en banc 
review.”216  If a majority of the circuit agrees with the panel’s opinion or at 
least does not vote to hear the case en banc, the panel opinion is 
published.217  The panel opinion will include a notation—either in the text 
of the opinion or in a footnote—that the full court approved of the opinion 
through informal en banc review.218 
 
 207. See Rymer, supra note 205, at 321–22. 
 208. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-3. 
 209. See FED. R. APP. P. 29(a). 
 210. See Vacca, supra note 128, at 743. 
 211. See id. 
 212. See id. at 743–44. 
 213. See id. at 744. 
 214. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 725. 
 215. See id. 
 216. See id. at 726. 
 217. See id. 
 218. See id. 
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Nine of the thirteen federal circuits have implemented some sort of mini 
or informal en banc review.219  This includes the First, Second, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits.220  These circuits 
have used informal en banc review in various types of circumstances 
including when a panel addresses a question of first impression, when a 
panel creates or continues a circuit split, and even when a panel overrules 
circuit precedent.221  Using informal en banc review to overrule circuit 
precedent has been criticized for violating the law-of-the-circuit rule and, 
thus, undermining horizontal stare decisis.222 
Only the Seventh Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have meaningfully 
attempted to justify their use of informal en banc review by creating actual 
governing procedures.  The Seventh Circuit authorizes informal en banc 
review by Local Rule 40(e).223  The D.C. Circuit has promulgated a policy 
statement governing the use of informal en banc review.224  The remaining 
circuits who use informal en banc review regularly—the First, Second, 
Fifth, and Tenth Circuits—have not clearly defined when using informal en 
banc procedures is appropriate. 
1.  The Seventh and D.C. Circuits 
The Seventh Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1969.225  
In 1976, the Seventh Circuit promulgated Local Rule 40(e), which 
provides: 
A proposed opinion approved by a panel of this court adopting a position 
which would overrule a prior decision of this court or create a conflict 
between or among circuits shall not be published unless it is first 
circulated among the active members of this court and a majority of them 
do not vote to rehear en banc the issue of whether the position should be 
adopted.  In the discretion of the panel, a proposed opinion which would 
establish a new rule or procedure may be similarly circulated before it is 
issued.  When the position is adopted by the panel after compliance with 
this procedure, the opinion, when published, shall contain a footnote 
worded, depending on the circumstances, in substance as follows:  This 
opinion has been circulated among all judges of this court in regular 
 
 219. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 726–27. 
 220. See id.  The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits, however, have rarely used informal 
en banc procedures and the Sixth Circuit has only used it once—where the decision was later 
overturned. Id. at 729.  The Third Circuit specifically disavows any informal en banc 
procedure in its local rules. See 3D CIR. I.O.P. 9.1 (“It is the tradition of this court that the 
holding of a panel in a precedential opinion is binding on subsequent panels.  Thus, no 
subsequent panel overrules the holding in a precedential opinion of a previous panel.  Court 
en banc consideration is required to do so.”). 
 221. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 725. 
 222. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
 223. See 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). 
 224. See generally Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions, U.S. 
CT. APPEALS D.C. CIRCUIT (Jan. 17, 1996), http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/
home.nsf/Content/VL%20-%20RPP%20-%20Irons%20Footnote/$FILE/IRONS.PDF. 
 225. See United States v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930, 934 n.5 (7th Cir. 1969). 
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active service. (No judge favored, or A majority did not favor) a rehearing 
en banc on the question of (e.g., overruling Doe v. Roe.).226 
The cases that employ the Seventh Circuit’s informal en banc procedure do 
not explain or justify why it is used; rather, they contain a version of the 
footnote required by Rule 40(e) along with a citation to the local rule.227 
The D.C. Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1977.228  In 
Irons v. Diamond,229 decided four years later, the D.C. Circuit formalized 
the use of informal en banc review.  The Court, faced with two inconsistent 
decisions, overruled one decision and, in doing so, stated in a footnote:  
“The foregoing part of the division’s decision, because it resolves an 
apparent conflict between two prior decisions, has been separately 
considered and approved by the full court, and thus constitutes the law of 
the circuit.”230 
Since then, the D.C. Circuit began using the “so-called Irons footnote[]” 
in cases that would ordinarily require en banc review.231  The circuit 
expanded the range of justifications for using the Irons footnote procedure, 
including:  to extend or limit earlier panel decisions,232 to reject dicta,233 
and to overrule decisions deemed incorrect.234 
On January 17, 1996, in an apparent attempt to standardize the use of the 
Irons footnote procedure, the D.C. Circuit promulgated a “Policy Statement 
on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions” indentifying the types of 
cases where the Irons footnote procedure was acceptable.235  The policy 
statement expressly acknowledges that the procedure is a substitute for 
formal en banc review and may be called for when “the circumstances of 
the case or the importance of the legal questions presented do not warrant 
the heavy administrative burdens of full en banc hearing.”236  The policy 
statement notes the type of cases where the informal en banc procedure is 
appropriate: 
(1) resolving an apparent conflict in the prior decisions of panels of the 
court; 
(2) rejecting a prior statement of law which, although arguably dictum, 
warrants express rejection to avoid future confusion; 
 
 226. 7TH CIR. R. 40(e). 
 227. See, e.g., Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928, 942 n.7 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
Mitrione, 357 F.3d 712, 718 n.2 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1097 
(2005); Gibson v. West, 201 F.3d 990, 994 n.3 (7th Cir. 2000). 
 228. See United States v. Sheppard, 569 F.2d 114 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 229. 670 F.2d 265 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 230. See id. at 268 n.11. 
 231. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 735. 
 232. See Londrigan v. FBI, 722 F.2d 840, 844–45 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
 233. See U.S. Dep’t of Navy v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 952 F.2d 1434, 1439 n.5 
(D.C. Cir. 1992). 
 234. See In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(Henderson, J., concurring). 
 235. See Policy Statement on En Banc Endorsement of Panel Decisions, supra note 224. 
 236. See id. 
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(3) overruling an old or obsolete decision which, although still 
technically valid as precedent, has plainly been rendered obsolete by 
subsequent legislation or other developments; and 
(4) overruling a more recent precedent which, due to an intervening 
Supreme Court decision, or the combined weight of authority from other 
circuits, a panel is convinced is clearly an incorrect statement of current 
law.237 
The D.C. Circuit is the only circuit to explicitly state that it uses the 
informal en banc procedure in cases where formal en banc review is 
appropriate, but not important enough to be granted.238  It is also the only 
circuit to articulate specific guidelines governing the informal en banc 
procedure’s application.239 
2.  The First, Second, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits 
The informal en banc procedures of the First, Second, Fifth, and Tenth 
Circuits are purely a product of case law. 
The First Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1990.240  In 
Gallagher v. Wilton Enterprises,241 decided two years later, the First Circuit 
attempted to justify the use of informal en banc review in a footnote: 
Because this case required us to reexamine [an earlier circuit precedent], 
we would ordinarily have convened the en banc court.  We have, 
however, in rare instances, where it has become reasonably clear that a 
prior precedent of this court was erroneously decided or is no longer good 
law, achieved the same result more informally by circulating the proposed 
panel opinion to all the active judges of the court for pre-publication 
comment.  While this practice is to be used sparingly and with extreme 
caution, we have employed it in the special circumstances of this case, 
with the result that the entire court has approved the overruling of [the 
earlier circuit precedent] on the point at issue.242 
The First Circuit frequently cites Gallagher as a justification for 
implementing informal en banc review.243 
The Second Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1966.244  
Since then, the Second Circuit has used the procedure regularly.245  While 
 
 237. Id. 
 238. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 736. 
 239. See id. at 745. 
 240. See United States v. Bucuvalas, 909 F.2d 593 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 241. 962 F.2d 120 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 242. Id. at 124 n.4 (citation omitted). 
 243. See, e.g., Educadores Puertorriqueños en Acción v. Hernández, 367 F.3d 61, 67 n.2 
(1st Cir. 2004); Crowe v. Bolduc, 365 F.3d 86, 89 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 244. See United States v. Malafronte, 357 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. 
Freeman, 357 F.2d 606 (2d Cir. 1966). 
 245. See, e.g., Shipping Corp. of India v. Jaldhi Overseas PTE, 585 F.3d 58, 67 (2d Cir. 
2009) (“We readily acknowledge that a panel of our Court is ‘bound by the decisions of prior 
panels until such time as they are overruled either by an en banc panel of our Court or by the 
Supreme Court,’ and thus that it would ordinarily be neither appropriate nor possible for us 
to reverse an existing Circuit precedent.  In this case, however, we have circulated this 
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many opinions state that they have been circulated to all active members of 
the court, no case has established “the procedure or its acceptable uses.”246 
The Fifth Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1984, in 
Affholder, Inc. v. Southern Rock, Inc.247 In Affholder, Inc., the Fifth Circuit 
attempted to justify the use of the informal en banc procedure: 
Mindful of the law of the circuit rule, which forbids one panel to overrule 
another save when a later statute or Supreme Court decision has changed 
the applicable law, this opinion has been considered not only by all 
members of the panels in those [opinions that have been overruled] but 
also by all judges in active service who were not members of those 
. . . panels.248 
Since Affholder, Inc., the Fifth Circuit has noted its policy of treating 
informal circulation of an opinion as equivalent to formal en banc 
review.249 
The Tenth Circuit first used an informal en banc procedure in 1984.250  
Since then, the Tenth Circuit has regularly implemented informal en banc 
review.  While opinions that use the informal en banc procedure note that 
the opinion was circulated because it overrules prior decisions and that all 
or a majority of the judges agreed with the disposition on the particular 
question of law, no case has established the procedure for its use or its 
acceptable uses.251 
3.  Critiquing Informal En Banc Review 
A major question is whether informal en banc procedures are fair.  While 
the Supreme Court has not commented on informal en banc processes, at 
least one scholar has argued that use of informal en banc review creates 
several problems, including that it may (1) undermine the principle of 
horizontal stare decisis, (2) create potential negative effects on traditionally 
marginalized groups, (3) diminish collegiality on the court, (4) reduce 
meaningful opportunities for parties to participate in the process, (5) create 
uncertainty about the weight of informal en banc opinions, or (6) allow full 
endorsement of opinions based on less than thorough review.252 
Judge Karen L. Henderson, of the D.C. Circuit, argues that the D.C. 
Circuit’s informal en banc procedure—the “Irons Footnote”—has “serious 
flaws.”253  This is because it does not have “any of the safeguards or 
 
opinion to all active members of this Court prior to filing and have received no objection.” 
(quoting United States v. Wilkerson, 361 F.3d 717, 732 (2d Cir. 2004))). 
 246. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 730–31. 
 247. 746 F.2d 305 (5th Cir. 1984). 
 248. Id. at 311. 
 249. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 731–32. 
 250. See EEOC v. Gaddis, 733 F.2d 1373 (10th Cir. 1984). 
 251. See Sloan, supra note 30, at 734. 
 252. See id. at 744–45.  For a more detailed discussion of the arguments made against 
using informal en banc review, see id. at 744–64. 
 253. See In re Sealed Case No. 97-3112, 181 F.3d 128, 146 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (en banc) 
(Henderson, J., concurring). 
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formalities attending the en banc process.”254  Judge Henderson further 
argues that allowing a three-judge panel to decide a question that would 
normally require full court consideration without the full court having the 
benefit of further briefing or argument is not consistent with “[r]easoned 
decisionmaking and stare decisis.”255  Due to the informal en banc process, 
parties do not have the opportunity to rebrief or reargue the case.256  Rather, 
the decision is based on the panel’s proposed opinion and whatever 
justification the panel provides.257 
III.  THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF EN BANC REVIEW 
Both advocates and critics of en banc review recognize that advantages 
and disadvantages accompany having a circuit court hear and rehear cases 
en banc.  To determine why there is such a discrepancy in the use of the en 
banc procedure in the various circuits, it is helpful to understand the policy 
implications of using en banc review. 
This Part outlines the positive and negative aspects of the formal en banc 
procedure.  Part III.A summarizes the key arguments made for promoting 
the en banc process.  Part III.B summarizes the criticisms and disadvantages 
of the en banc process.   
A.  The Benefits of En Banc Review 
There are many important reasons for a circuit to convene en banc.  For 
instance, a “rehearing en banc allows the full court to maintain consistency 
in the case law—intracircuit, intercircuit, or between the circuit and the 
Supreme Court.”258  It allows the full court to address issues of great 
importance.259  And it is the sole means by which the court as a whole can 
ensure that decisions by its panels are in line with circuit preferences.260 
In United States v. American-Foreign Steamship Corp.,261 the Supreme 
Court outlined many of the advantages of en banc proceedings.  First, 
because en banc courts “are convened only when extraordinary 
circumstances exist,” they make “for more effective judicial administration” 
where “[c]onflicts within a circuit will be avoided” and “[f]inality of 
decision in the circuit courts of appeal will be promoted.”262  These 
considerations are important because in the existing “federal judicial system 
[the courts of appeals] are the courts of last resort in the run of ordinary 
cases.”263 
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Second, because not every case is one where “extraordinary 
circumstances exist,” the en banc procedure does not replace the traditional 
practice of having three-judge panels hear and decide cases where there is 
no conflict within the circuit and, thus, the en banc procedure is not a waste 
of time and judicial resources.264 
Third, en banc decisions presumably represent the court’s collective 
judgment and secure uniformity in the circuit because all the active circuit 
judges have the opportunity to determine the “major doctrinal trends of the 
future for their court.”265 
Scholars have advanced other arguments for promoting the use of en 
banc review.  A serious advantage is that, although they are not binding on 
other circuits, en banc decisions may exert greater persuasive influence on 
other circuits.266  The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, for example, have 
verified that this is often true.267 
Having the courts of appeals sit en banc may also be helpful to the 
Supreme Court.268  First, “[f]or cases in which the justices would be likely 
to be asked to consider a panel’s ruling, an en banc hearing might resolve 
the case and make Supreme Court review unnecessary.”269  Second, for 
those en banc cases of which the Supreme Court does grant review, the en 
banc decision “would also provide assurance that the doctrinal rule 
announced by the courts of appeals was held by a majority of that court’s 
judges.”270  And, finally, because en banc rehearings allow more complete 
consideration (since more judges are present) and provides perspective not 
available to the panel, en banc decisions “present the Supreme Court with a 
wider range of interpretation than a three-judge panel would . . . provide,” 
which “would make the justices better informed in deciding to grant review 
and then in developing their own ruling.”271 
The en banc procedure is a useful tool to deal with the agency problem 
that results from delegating cases to three judge panels.272  The agency 
problem is this:  “the members of any given three-judge panel could 
potentially be outliers who have different dispositions, biases, and 
preferences and do not decide a case in the same way as the full circuit 
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would.”273  En banc review, however, allows the full circuit to review 
decisions made by three-judge panels.274 
Additionally, the en banc process is useful because, due to the 
discretionary nature of the Supreme Court’s writ of certiorari, a vast 
majority of circuit court decisions are denied review by the Supreme Court 
upon further appeal and thus the circuit courts are functionally a “court[] of 
last resort” in the majority of cases.275 
B.  The Negative Aspects of En Banc Review 
Critics contend that en banc rehearings are overly time consuming and 
inefficient, that they fail to “serve their intended purpose,” and they are “too 
often abused for political ends.”276 
Judge Irving R. Kaufman, a former Second Circuit judge, criticized the 
en banc procedure for being inefficient.277  Because petitions for an en banc 
rehearing are routinely filed as a matter of course by counsel, each circuit 
receives a very large number of petitions.278 
Judge Kaufman argued that the amount of time that it takes to review the 
abundance of petitions amounts to a waste of judicial resources.279  From 
1981 to 1986, for example, every Second Circuit judge examined over 750 
petitions for rehearing en banc, yet the circuit voted in only twenty-seven en 
banc polls.280  This increases delays in the court.281 
Judge Kaufman argued that these inefficiencies and delays are 
heightened when rehearings en banc are actually granted which, in turn, 
burden the judiciary and the litigant—who has to wait even longer for the 
final resolution of the case.282  Delays result because the “[e]n banc 
opinions must be written and circulated among the members of the en banc 
court; invariably they spark a blizzard of memoranda in an effort to forge a 
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consensus.”283  Judge Kaufman emphasized that the delay “occasioned by 
the en banc proceeding is startling” because “[t]he interval between oral 
argument and en banc disposition is five times as great—on average—as 
that for a panel disposition.”284 
Judge Kaufman also argued that en banc decisions often lead to 
inconsistency.285  This is because an en banc decision frequently “produces 
either a majority opinion that was crafted in a purposefully vague manner to 
forge a consensus within the court, or a litany of diverging opinions, 
injecting a degree of uncertainty into the law.”286  This, he said, “deprives 
the judicial process of its quintessential elements of stability and order” 
and, thus, splintered en banc decisions often generate more uncertainty.287 
Furthermore, Judge Kaufman argued that en banc proceedings threaten 
the “institutional integrity of the appellate court and the three-judge 
panel.”288  This is because en banc proceedings send the message that 
“decisions reached by three-judge panels are not final, but represent merely 
one step on an elongated appellate ladder.”289 
Other critics have argued that en banc rehearings are often abused for 
political ends.290  The argument is that there are ideological motivations 
behind the decision to grant en banc review—namely, judges abuse the en 
banc process by overturning panel outcomes that are at odds with the 
prevailing ideological view of the court.291  This is troublesome because it 
intensifies internal conflict on a circuit court, threatens collegiality between 
judges, and creates the danger of polarizing courts.292  And “[w]hen 
ideological preferences begin to dominate judicial decisionmaking, 
polarization and instability result.”293  According to Judge Harry T. 
Edwards, collegiality is essential to judicial decisionmaking, and when en 
banc review is used to advance ideological ends, it will encourage open 
politicking among judges.294  This “[p]oliticking will replace the thoughtful 
dialogue that should characterize a court where every judge respects the 
integrity of his or her colleagues.”295  Additionally, using en banc review to 
advance ideological ends questions the integrity of panel judges “who are 
both intelligent enough to know the law and conscientious enough to abide 
by their oath to uphold it.”296 
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Another critique is that the en banc procedure is impractical.297  En banc 
review was recognized to allow the full court to convene to hear or rehear a 
particular case.298  However, larger circuits, like the Ninth Circuit, are 
forced to sit as a limited en banc court, where less than the full court meets 
to decide a case that normally would be decided by the full court, as an 
alternative to engaging in full-blown en banc review.299 
Finally, critics point out that the en banc process lacks judicial 
transparency.  This is because “[t]he public does not know whether a vote 
occurs, which judges vote when a vote does occur, which way judges vote, 
nor the final count of the votes.”300 
IV.  REDEFINING EN BANC REVIEW 
This Part enunciates a new standard that should be adopted for en banc 
review:  to obtain en banc review, a judge must request en banc 
consideration (i.e., litigants should no longer have the ability to petition for 
en banc review) and the judge’s suggestion must be affirmatively voted on 
by a lower threshold of the active circuit judges (i.e., the now-required 
majority vote of active-duty judges should be reduced). 
The current en banc regime is confusing and problematic. Courts and 
commentators have suggested a variety of reforms to the en banc procedure.  
The first reform, which many circuits use, is some type of informal en banc 
procedure.301  These types of procedures are inadequate because they do not 
allow litigants to further brief the court and they lack adequate opportunity 
for notice and comment.302 
It may be beneficial to require all circuits to publish their en banc 
procedures, including these types of informal decisionmaking procedures, 
in their circuit rules.  However, this would not respond to the criticism that 
the en banc procedure is time consuming, inefficient, fails to serve its 
intended purpose, and is too often abused for political ends.303 
In adopting an adequate reform, the litigant’s interest in securing 
adequate review of his or her case must be balanced against the need to 
preserve limited judicial resources.  En banc review provides another 
opportunity for a person to obtain a favorable ruling because it gives a 
person another chance to have their case heard.304  However, en banc 
review is rarely obtained,305 and tightening the standard required to obtain 
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en banc review would likely not impact the probability of a person 
obtaining it. 
An extreme structural reform is necessary to respond to the criticisms of 
the en banc procedure.  The most promising reform would be to no longer 
allow a litigant to petition for en banc review and instead only allow the 
suggestion to be raised by a judge sua sponte.306  This would directly 
respond to the critics’ assertion that the en banc process is an inefficient use 
of judicial time,307 and would also free up judicial resources to review 
decisions by three-judge panels that are worthy of en banc review.308  As 
the Fifth Circuit’s local rules indicate, “frequently [en banc] rehearings 
granted result from a request for en banc reconsideration by a judge of the 
court rather than a petition by the parties.”309  Thus, since petitions by 
litigants are rarely granted the burden on litigants may not be that dramatic. 
With en banc petitions no longer being filed as a matter of course by 
counsel,310 circuit judges will likely hold in much higher esteem a judge’s 
suggestion that a case be reviewed en banc.311  And the requirement that 
only a judge may suggest a hearing or rehearing en banc may actually result 
in a better selection of cases to receive en banc review because those cases 
truly deserving en banc review will no longer be lost among a pile of 
routine petitions filed by counsel.312 
This reform, however, would require overruling part of the Western 
Pacific decision313 where the Supreme Court said that a circuit court must 
give a litigant the opportunity to suggest to the court “that a particular case 
is appropriate for consideration by all the judges.”314  The benefits that 
would be obtained—e.g., freeing up judicial time and resources, decreasing 
delays in the disposition of a case, and enhancing judicial transparency 
throughout the en banc process315—outweigh the negative impact on the 
litigant. 
To deal with the enhanced burden on the litigant that would arise by 
barring litigants from petitioning for en banc review, the circuits should 
adopt an approach where less than a majority of active-duty judge’s votes 
are required to garner en banc review.316  This would require amending 
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35.317 
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Some commentators have suggested that Rule 35 should be changed to 
require the approval of a supermajority to activate en banc review.318  
Commentators suggest that this would “blunt the effects of shifting 
majorities voting largely on ideological grounds.”319  This reform should be 
rejected because (1) while it may respond to the criticism that en banc 
review is too often abused to further political ends, it still does not respond 
to the argument that the en banc procedure is an overly time consuming, 
inefficient procedure,320 and (2) by requiring the affirmative vote of a 
supermajority of active-duty judges there will be a decrease in the total 
number of en banc hearings by making it harder to obtain the adequate 
number of votes. 
The importance of en banc review outweighs the potential for political 
abuse—as judges “are both intelligent enough to know the law and 
conscientious enough to abide by their oath to uphold it”321—and therefore, 
the number of votes required to obtain en banc review should be lessened.  
The Supreme Court, for example, only requires the affirmative vote of four 
justices to grant certiorari, which is less than a simple majority of the 
justices.322  Because the decision to grant en banc review can be as 
important as the writ of certiorari it should also require less than a majority 
of active-duty judges’ votes. 
Therefore, to make the en banc process more efficient, a reform that one, 
requires a judge to request en banc consideration rather than a procedure 
that allows litigants to petition for en banc review and two, requires a lower 
number of votes to activate en banc review, should be adopted. 
CONCLUSION 
The federal courts of appeals are permitted to sit en banc to hear a case or 
rehear a case decided by a three-judge panel.  Every circuit has local rules 
that permit it to sit en banc and detail its en banc procedure.  However, en 
banc review is rarely invoked across all the circuits.  Critics contend that en 
banc review is an inefficient, overly costly procedure that rarely serves its 
intended purpose.  Despite its downsides, there are certain cases that require 
a decision by the full court to resolve panel conflict and to ensure sound 
circuit law—like Gregory Wilson’s case, where the Sixth Circuit law time 
barring his claim was overturned in a later case.  Thus, to minimize the 
burden on the courts and to ensure that proper cases are heard en banc a rule 
should be adopted where judges may call for an en banc hearing or 
rehearing sua sponte, but litigants are precluded from petitioning for en 
banc review.  Additionally, to determine whether a certain case should be 
heard en banc, the number of votes needed should be less than a majority of 
all active-duty judges on the circuit court. 
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